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STATE OF UTAH 
S T E V E N BOWMAN, H E N R Y J . 
BOWMAN, SARA J U N E P E T T E R -
SON, and M I C H A E L BOWMAN, 
a minor, by June Bowman, his Guardian, 
Plaintiff s/R espondents, 
-vs-
J O H N D U S S A U L T , D O R O T H Y 
D U S S A U L T and D O N A L D 
BOWMAN, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
A P P E L L A N T S J O H N A N D D O R O T H Y 
D U S S A U L T ' S B R I E F ON A P P E A L 
S T A T E M E N T O F 
T H E N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
The Appellants, John Dussault and Dorothy 
Dussault appeal from a Judgment of the District Court 
of the Second Judicial District, the Honorable John F . 
Wahlquist, Judge, imposing liability against them in 
Case No. 
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the sum of $143,526.03 based upon a claim of respon-
dents that the appellants were liable for mismanage-
ment of a trust of which plaintiffs were beneficiaries. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E COURT B E L O W 
Respondents, contingent beneficiaries of a trust 
which the appellants, John and Dorothy Dussault and 
Donald Bowman were trustees, filed suit in the District 
Court of the Second Judicial District, Weber County, 
alleging liability against the appellants due to the alleged 
neglect and failure of appellants to properly discharge 
duties as trustees (R. 16-17). Trial was held beginning 
the 10th day of December, 1973, in the District Court 
of Weber County, sitting without a jury. Judgment 
was entered on the 5th day of March, 1974, in favor of 
the plaintiffs as heretofore mentioned. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The appellants seek reversal of the judgment of 
the District Court with instructions to enter a judgment 
of no cause of action or in the alternative for a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
A. Relationship of the Parties. Marie Dorothy 
Wattis, a lady of substantial wealth executed a trust 
instrument in February, 1938, in which she disposed of 
her property by establishing two separate trusts, one 
for her daughter, Estella Wattis Bowman, and another 
trust for her daughter, Mary Brown. (R. 3-9; 59-71). 
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According to the trust instrument, Estella Wattis 
Bowman, and Mary Brown were life beneficiaries of 
their respective trusts and entitled to all of the income 
during their lifetimes. Their mother also appointed 
them Trustees of each of the trusts. 
Upon the death of Marie Dorothy Wattis, the 
Wattis' estate was divided in equal parts and this liti-
gation is involved only with the half of the Wattis estate 
that passed to Estella Wattis Bowman, referred to 
herein as Mrs. Bowman. 
Mrs. Bowman had three (3) children, William A. 
Bowman, the father of the plaintiffs in this action, 
Donald Bowman and Dorothy Bowman Dussault. John 
Dussault, one of the defendants, is the husband of 
Dorothy Dussault. (R. 236-240). 
In addition to Estella Wattis Bowman acting as 
Trustee, in her own trust, Mary Brown, her sister, and 
also her husband were Trustees. 
In 1948, Mrs. Bowman's husband died and Dorothy 
Dussault was made Trustee (R. 237). In 1960, Mrs. 
Bowman's sister, Mary Brown, died and, at that time, 
Mrs. Bowman and Dorothy Dussault appointed John 
Dussault Trustee (R. 239). 
B. Background on John Dussault. By way of 
formal education, John Dussault had only two weeks 
in the sixth grade (R. 288). After, he worked as dish-
washer in a restaurant, a short-order cook, shipping 
clerk, etc., until 1930, when he saved up enough money 
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and bought a truck and went into the trucking business 
(R. 288). Thereafter, he schooled himself by reading 
manuals and books relating to insurance, real estate, 
etc. (R. 287). Until he was made Trustee in the estate 
of his mother-in-law, he had no stock investments ex-
perience whatever (R. 290). 
At the time he was requested by his mother-in-law 
to act as Trustee he was reluctant to do so, particularly 
in view of a lawsuit or threatened lawsuit by some of 
the family in relationship to the Mary Brown half of 
the trust (R. 293). 
Mrs. Bowman took out the trust instrument, read 
it to John and explained how the trust had been delib-
erately set up so that the trustees could handle the 
property as though it were their own property, the 
trust had exculpatory provisions deliberately written 
in to protect the trustees, and that they would not be 
vulnerable or susceptible to being sued as long as they 
were doing the best they could with the trust. At that 
time, she suggested to John that he call attorney Bridges, 
who prepared the trust instrument and verify her as-
surances. Attorney Bridges was a member of the firm 
Allen, Warren and Bridges in San Francisco. John 
took her advice, called Mr. Bridges to determine the 
extent of his liability in the event he was to act as trustee 
(R. 252-4). 
Attorney Bridges went into considerable detail with 
John during their telephone conversation when Dussault 
was advised by Bridges that he would not assume per-
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sonal liability because of exculpatory provisions in the 
trust. Thereafter, John accepted the appointment and 
agreed to act as Trustee (R. 295). This was in 1961 
(R. 290). 
Mrs. Bowman expressed her desires to revise the 
portfolio of the trust, disposing of the bonds, etc., indi-
cating that she wanted growth for income, that she was 
strapped for income as a result of the support she had 
to give the William H. Bowman family and further the 
expenses she incurred trying to get him out of trouble 
(R. 256-257). Mrs. Bowman was a very strong woman 
and had great influence on the management of the trust, 
particularly in view of the fact that she was the life 
beneficiary and Trustee (R.307) (Findings of Fact 
and R. 192). 
C. Trustee Conduct. When John Dussault agreed 
to act as Trustee, the value of the trust was approxi-
mately $188,000.00. (R. 297-298). Sometime in or 
around 1965, the Trustees began purchasing stocks on 
margin (R. 300). The margin purchases were discussed 
in advance with Mrs. Bowman, Dorothy Dussault and 
Bill Bowman (R. 301). At that time, it was logically 
assumed by everyone that Bill, Dorothy, and Don would 
inherit the trust property because their mother was el-
derly and they were all in reasonably good health. I t is 
reasonable to assume she must have anticipated her 
death within a reasonably short period of time, since 
she distributed $180,000.00 to each of her children in 
April of 1965 (R. 424), and the court found that she 
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was suffering from a circulatory disease in the form of 
hardening of the arteries and by 1964 she and others 
began to anticipate her death. As a result of purchasing 
on margin the value of the estate was increased in 1967 
to $442,000.00 (R. 302). Dur ing the next several years, 
however, as investments were made on margin, the trust 
diminished (R. 303). 
Dur ing that period of time, the stock market was 
failing every day a little bit at a time and the analysts 
were saying that the market was going to tu rn around 
and things were going to get better and the Trustees 
hoped that this would be true (R. 306). Dur ing that 
period of time, Mrs. Bowman made it clear to John 
Dussault, Dorothy and Bill and others that she had a 
right to govern that t rust and that she even had a right 
to take the entire corpus of the trust if she wanted (R. 
307). 
When John Dussault became Trustee, Mrs. Bow-
man advised him that from the years 1958 to 1959, the 
estate had decreased in value from $204,000.00 down to 
$188,000.00, because they were conservative, because 
they had invested in conservative type bonds, etc. (R. 
237). Mrs. Bowman felt that since she had made sub-
stantial cash contributions to her children that it was 
now important to make the trust grow (R. 250, 256). 
As Dorothy Dussault testified, Mrs. Bowman wanted 
growth both to increase the corpus and for income (R. 
256). 
Notwithstanding what could logically be anticipated 
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by the family, William Bowman was killed in an auto-
mobile accident in May 1970 (R. 423). Mrs. Bowman 
survived until October 31,1970 (R. 447). The plaintiffs 
in this action are the children of William Bowman who 
have now filed action against their Aunt Dorothy Dus-
sault, their Uncle Donald Bowman, and their Uncle 
John Dussault, for having dissipated the estate through 
their investment practices. 
D. Investment Practices. When John Dussault 
became a successor Trustee, the trust was administered 
by the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco (R. 
239-240). Advice on trust investments was obtained 
from Crocker National, Glore, Foregon & Stats and 
Dean Witter and Company (R. 241-242). Mrs. Bow-
man also made several suggestions on investment policy 
(R. 242). Eventually, the administration of the trust 
was moved to Commercial Security Bank in Ogden, 
Utah. Mrs. Bowman played an active role in the trust 
and was consulted in virtually every stock transaction 
(R. 291). Mr. Dussault testified that he conducted the 
investment of the trust the best he knew how and with 
the same diligence as he would his own account (R. 
295). He contacted brokers and read everything he 
could on investments. In addition to the before-men-
tioned companies from which he sought advice, he also 
sought advice from William R. Scott Company (R. 
299), and relied heavily upon Mr. Bob Erickson of Dean 
Witter and Company. No broker warned the Dussaults 
of any risk associated with investing on the margin (R. 
300). The purchase of conglomerates was favored in 
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the market and Mr. Dussault felt diversification was a 
safety in their purchase (R. 313). He was not full time 
in the administration of the family trust but had to 
operate his own business (R. 314). Mr. Dussault's own 
investments, aside from the trust, paralleled those in 
the portfolio of the trust (R. 427). During the invest-
ment period when Mr. Dussault was Trustee, he con-
sulted with numerous persons concerning appropriate 
investments (R. 441). H e was never dissuaded from 
purchasing on the margin (R. 442). H e submitted the 
trust instrument to Dean Witter and Company and they 
submitted the document to their legal department and 
advised that investing on the margin would be acceptable 
(R. 442, 451). The attorney who drafted the instru-
ment apparently confirmed that the Trustees had such 
power (R. 442). A letter dated November 17, 1961 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit H ) from Robert L. Bridges, At-
torney at Law in San Francisco, who prepared the in-
strument, advised the Dussaults of their very broad 
authority to invest under the trust. Article 8 of the trust 
instrument quoted in the Exhibit gave the trustees au-
thority to hold property of the trust estate in any 
property "whether or not any property at any time so 
held or any investments so made shall be of the character 
permitted by law for investment of trust funds" and 
also provided "the trustees, however, to assume or be 
under no personal liability in respect to any securities 
at any time held hereunder" and "in the execution of 
this trust they shall have the same and all powers and 
discretion that an absolute owner of property has or may 
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have . . . " Mr. Dussault testified that he acted for the 
trust and followed the advice received. H e acted for the 
trust. He was aware that if the trust lost money, his 
wife, a beneficiary, would also lose (R. 444). The trus-
tees received no compensation for their services. 
Respondents called an expert with reference to the 
investments (T. 342). When asked about Gulf and 
Western stock that had been purchased by appellants 
for the trust, he indicated that it was not a stock he fol-
lowed carefully but knew it to be a conglomerate stock. 
The trial court interjected that he had held Gulf and 
Western and sold it. (R. 354) Subsequently, the court 
took judicial notice of the whole conglomerate industry 
and in his findings concluded that such investments were 
highly speculative and that this included the stock of 
Gulf and Western (R. 194). Appellants' expert testi-
fied as to the necessity to minimize risks and felt that 
margin buying was not accepted practice (R. 354). He 
felt that the type of investments made during 1968 and 
1969 during the time the losses were suffered would be 
proper only if following a very aggressive approach 
(R. 355). An examination of his testimony shows that 
most of the stocks in which the trust invested during 
the period 1968 and 1969 were high yield stocks (R. 
305) with ratings of B or B + on the Standard and Poor 
scale. H e indicated that the loss of money was no indi-
cation of bad faith (R. 376) and that the investing on 
the margin simply went beyond the period of profit-
ability (R. 375-376). 
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E. Reno Ranch. Respondents claim additional 
damages against appellants resulting from a real estate 
transaction between John Dussault and respondents' 
grandmother, Mrs. Bowman. This action was not speci-
fically plead in the complaint (R. 1) or the amended 
complaint (R. 6) but was stated as a contention in the 
pre-trial order (R. 119). 
Mrs. Bowman was the sole owner of a piece of real 
property located by the Truckee River, outside the City 
of Reno, Nevada. The property was not in the trust. 
I t was known by the family as the Reno Ranch. The 
ranch was unproductive and deteriorating (R. 325, 335). 
Mrs. Bowman had asked John Dussault what he thought 
she ought to do with the ranch (R. 335). Dussault went 
to Reno and had the ranch appraised at somewhere be-
tween $90,000.00 and $110,000.00 (R. 335). The 
Truckee River would overflow from time to time and 
do substantial damage to that property (R. 335). 
Because of the problems related to the ranch, the 
flooding from time to time, the great distance that the 
Bowmans live from the ranch, the deteriorated condition 
of the buildings, etc., Mrs. Bowman approached John 
and asked him if he would trade it to her for another 
piece of property that he owned in his own name in 
Reno, Nevada, known to the family as the "Airport 
Road Property." (R. 33(5) That property was a corner 
lot in downtown Reno, leased out for $1,000.00 per 
month (R. 340). As a result of her offer, John and 
Dorothy invited Donald, Bill and Mrs. Bowman to go 
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to Reno for purposes of determining whether the trade 
of the ranch for the airport property was a fair and 
equitable trade. They went to Reno, saw the property 
and agreed that it was a fair trade (R. 336). At that 
time, the ranch was appraised by a local appraiser at 
the sum of $88,000.00 (R. 338). The airport road prop-
erty, which was solely owned by John Dussault, was 
appraised at that time at $95,000.00 (R. 338). A direct 
trade was made at that time between John Dussault 
and Mrs. Bowman. That transaction was evidenced by 
a deed in June, 1961. More than two years later, Mrs. 
Bowman transferred the airport road property into her 
trust by deed dated January 28, 1964. The purpose of 
the transaction, trading the Reno ranch for the airport 
road property was to provide income to Mrs. Bowman 
(R. 501). At the time of the transaction, all of the fam-
ily members were in Reno (R. 504). Subsequently, John 
Dussault sold the Reno ranch and realized $92,735.00 
(R. 506). The court found that the Reno ranch was 
sold by John Dussault for $120,000.00. The plaintiffs 
claim one-third of the difference between the value of 
the airport road property in the sum of $95,000.00 and 
the sale price of the Reno ranch in the sum of $120,-
000.00, or $8,333.33. The Reno Ranch property at the 
time of the transaction was not a part of the trust but 
was Mrs. Bowman's own property and John and 
Dorothy Dussault were not acting as Trustees. 
F . Trial Court's Findings and Judgment. The 
trial court's Findings of Fact do not give adequate at-
tention to the trust instrument and no reference in the 
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Conclusions of Law is made to the applicable standard 
the trial court used in determining liability. With refer-
ence to the stocks, the court found some of the invest-
ments too speculative (R. 195). The court found that 
because of lack of diversification and use of margins 
invested during 1968, 1969 and 1970, the trust was im-
properly managed resulting in losses of $296,577.00 
(R. 195-196). The court found that from 1966, the 
trust was managed primarily for the interest of the 
ultimate beneficiaries and not the life beneficiary and 
the margin investment constituted gross inattentiveness 
(R. 194). The court found no lack of good faith up to 
1966 (R. 192). The court found that the breach of duty 
by John and Dorothy Dussault was gross inattentive-
ness equivalent to bad faith and awarded $100.00 puni-
tive damages (R. 197). Based on the Findings, the 
court entered judgment against the appellants in the 
amount of $143,526.03. Included in this judgment was 
an award to the appellants for $9,638.00 because of a 
transaction involving the Reno ranch property here-
tofore mentioned which did not involve the trust but 
which the trial court, through some inexplicable reason, 
found the trust to be entitled to the recovery (R. 198). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N 
F I N D I N G L I A B I L I T Y A G A I N S T 
T H E A P P E L L A N T S FOR T R U S T 
M I S M A N A G E M E N T 
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The trial court determined that the appellants were 
liable to respondents for breach of their obligation as 
trustees. I t is submitted that this determination is erron-
eous as a matter of law and that this court should re-
serve and direct an entry of judgment in favor of the 
appellants. The basic question presented by this point 
on appeal is whether the appellants, John and Dorothy 
Dussault, violated their trust obligations in the admin-
istration of the Marie Dorothy Wat t i s trust. § 33-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a statutory expression 
of the so-called "prudent man" rule first adopted in 
this country in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 
(9 Pick.) 446 (1830). However, this court has recog-
nized that the before-referenced statutory provision is 
subject to the provisions of § 33-2-2, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, and does not govern where a trust instru-
ment provides a contrary standard. I n Dipo v. Dipo, 
526 P.2d 923, (Utah 1974), this court was confronted 
with the question as to whether the provisions of § 33-
2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, heretofore referenced 
controlled or whether a trust instrument could provide 
for a different standard of trustee conduct. This court 
observed: 
The trial court dismissed the complaint 
finding, among other facts, that the proposed 
purchase of assets from the estate was author-
ized by paragraph 10 of the trust agreement. 
Wi th this finding we agree. The terms of said 
paragraph are clear, unambiguous and confer 
upon the trustees considerable discretion. The 
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powers so conferred are much broader than 
Section 33-2-1, U.C.A. 1953, might confer, 
but would appear to be statutorily authorized 
by Section 33-2-2, U.C.A. 1953. 
Furthermore, it is a generally accepted 
principle of law that the terms of the trust, 
unless illegal or agaimt public policy, govern 
over such statutes as the 'prudent man' statute 
of this State with regard to the investment of 
trust funds. (Emphasis added). 
This is in accord with the general rule that a trust in-
strument may control trust investments or authorize 
standards other than those set out in statutes unless 
there is the clear intention of the legislature to the con-
trary. Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, 2d ed. § 543, 681. 
Further, it is well established that in interpreting a 
trust agreement, the court should make an effort to ef-
fectuate the purposes and intent of the settlor. Arizona 
v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1966) : 
A general principle of law applied to either 
a private or charitable trust is, that when a 
Trust is created by a written instrument, the 
intention of the Settlor is ascertained from 
the express language of the instrument, and 
the Court will not go outside the instrument 
in an attempt to give effect to what it conceives 
to have been the actual intent or motive of 
the Settlor. If, however, the intention is not 
plainly expressed, or if the language used is 
ambiguous, there are well established rules 
which Courts will envoke to aid them in the 
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construction of the instrument. (Emphasis 
added) 
See also, Edwards v. Edwards, 459 P.2d 422 (Wash. 
App. 1969). I t is therefore necessary to look at the 
trust instrument in the instant case to ascertain the in-
tention of the settlor as to the standards of conduct to 
which the appellants were to be held and the ultimate 
liability for their conduct. Article V I I I of the trust in-
strument provides: 
To carry out the express purpose of this 
trust, and in aid of its proper execution and 
the administration, management, and disposi-
tion of the trust estate, the T R U S T E E S are 
vested with the following powers and discre-
tions : 
At their option and as long as they may 
deem advisable, within the term of this trust, 
to retain and hold any property of the trust 
estate, and to invest and reinvest the principal 
(and income if accumulated) in any property, 
whether or not any property at any time so 
held or any investments so made shall be of 
the character permitted by law for investment 
of trust funds. To manage, control, sell, con-
vey, partition, divide, subdivide, exchange, im-
prove, repair, and to encumber by mortgage, 
trust deed, or otherwise and in accordance with 
such proceedings as they may deem advisable, 
the trust estate or any part thereof. To lease 
the trust estate or any part thereof for terms 
within or extending beyond the term of this 
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trust and to grant, for like terms, the right 
to mine or drill for and remove therefrom gas, 
oil, or other minerals. To allot and distribute 
the trust estate at such valuations as the 
T R U S T E E S may determine upon whenever 
such act shall be required, and to do do in 
kind or partly in kind and partly in money, 
according to their valuation thereof. To deter-
mine, in their discretion, what is principal of 
the trust estate, gross income, or net distribu-
table income therefrom. To effect insurance 
of such forms and of such amounts as neces-
sarily shall be required for the proper protec-
tion of the trust estate. To determine the ident-
ity of persons entitled to take hereunder and 
the proportions in which they shall take. To 
have respecting bonds, shares of stock, and 
other securities, all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of an owner including, though with-
out limiting the foregoing, holding securities 
in the name of the T R U S T E E S or otherwise; 
voting, giving proxies, payment of calls, as-
sessments and other sums deemed by the 
T R U S T E E S expedient for the protection of 
the interests of the trust estate, exchanging 
securities, selling or exercising stock subscrip-
tions and conversion rights, participating in 
foreclosures, reorganizations, consolidations, 
mergers, liquidations, pooling agreements, 
voting trusts, assenting to or opposing cor-
porate sales, leases, and encumbrances; the 
T R U S T E E S , however to assume or be under 
no personal liability in respect of any securities 
at any time held hereunder. To reimburse 
themselves out of the income and/or principal 
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of the trust estate for any loss, liability, or 
expense personally sustained or incurred by 
reason of their ownership or holding of any 
property received or held in trust. In the ex-
ecution of this trust, they shall have the same 
and all powers and discretions that an absolute 
owner of property has or may have; and all 
discretions in this instrument conferred upon 
the T R U S T E E S , unless specifically limited, 
shall be absolute and uncontrolled. The 
T R U S T E E S shall have the continuing un-
controllable discretionary powers herein given, 
with regard to both real and personal property, 
as well as and in addition to the powers and 
authority conferred by statute or otherwise 
lawfully existing, all to be exercised by them 
without application to or the prior consent or 
subsequent approval of any court or judicial 
authority; and all their acts in good faith 
hereunder shall be conclusive on all parties in 
interest, and no person dealing with them shall 
be under any duty to inquire into the necessity 
or propriety of their acts or to see to the appli-
cation of any money or other property delivered 
to them. 
As can be seen, the provisions of the trust instrument 
grant to the trustees broad power in managing the cor-
pus of the trust and appear to manifest an intention 
on the part of the settlor that the liability of the trustees 
was to be very limited. In fact, the language of the 
trust instrument provides that there is to be no personal 
liability. I t should be remembered that this was a family 
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trust in which family members were holding the assets 
and engaged in the management of the corpus. Obvious-
ly, the settlor wanted to keep harmony within the fam-
ily and insure that benefits were at the same time con-
ferred upon the beneficiaries of the trust. The findings 
of the trial court recognized that a secondary motivation 
of the trust was an attempt to preserve a family empire 
(R. 190). Since the settlor sought to name as trustees 
persons who were not commercial trustees and to give 
the broadest authority in managing the trust to such 
persons, it is apparent that it was never intended by the 
settlor to impose liability aginst the appellants in this 
particular case. Such an intent is manifest from Article 
V I I I . As noted in JDipo v. Dipo, supra, the terms of 
the trust, unless illegal or against public policy, are 
to govern. In the instant case, there was no conversion 
of the assets of the trust or self-dealing. There was only 
the investment by inexpert members of a family in what 
the court found to be speculative investments. The 
testimony of respondents' expert was that the nature 
of the investments were profitable for a time and then 
their profitability ran out. As was noted in Harvard 
College v. Amory, supra, risk investment is inescapable. 
Putman, Judge, observed Id. at 460 "Do what you 
will the capital is at hazard" and in Dickinson Appellant, 
152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890), it was observed: 
The question of the lawfulness and fitness of 
the investment is to be judged as of the time 
when it was made and not by subsequent facts 
which could not then have been anticipated. A 
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trustee in this Commonwealth undoubtedly 
finds it difficult to make satisfactory invest-
ments of trust property. The amount of funds 
seeking investment is very large; the demand 
for securities which are as safe as is possible 
in the affairs of this world is small, when com-
pared with the amount of money to be invested. 
The language of the trust instrument in the instant 
case would appear to impose substantial immunity as 
against the claim of liability against the appellants. 
Provisions in a trust exculpating the conduct of a 
trustee are proper. Warren v. Fazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 
89 N.E. 381 (1909); Restatement of Trusts 2d, § 222 
(1). First, they could invest in any property whether 
it was of the character permitted by law for the invest-
ment of trust funds. Consequently, the fact that the 
investments were of conglomerates that were speculative 
and lacked diversification would make no difference 
under the trust instrument. Nor would the fact that the 
investment was on margin be of concern. Margin in-
vestments are not against public policy and are not 
illegal and are common in the investment market. See 
Comment, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 103 (1967). Margin in-
vestments are controlled and thus sanctioned by Section 
7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
78g (Supp. IV 1969) and Regulation T and U of the 
Federal Reserve Board. Jennings and Marsh, Securities 
Regulation, 2d ed. p. 800-802. "Payment of calls" is 
expressly mentioned in the trust instrument. Such 
language is common to margin investment. Thus, the 
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trust instrument implicity sanctions margin investment 
which was reasonably common even before the execution 
of the trust instrument. Comment, 116 U.Pa.L.Rev. 
103-105. Therefore, the appellants are excluded from 
liability by the language in the trust instrument. 
Second, the trustees were to be under no personal 
liability in respect to any securities at any time under 
the trust authority. In effect, this provision is to excul-
pate the trustees from liability for investment choices 
that may later prove to be unwise or even risky. In In 
re Greenhouses Estate, 12 A. 2d 96 (Pa. 1940), the 
trust instrument read as follows: 
The trustees shall only be responsible for the 
exercise of reasonably prudent business judg-
ment. They shall not be responsible for any 
loss occasioned through any investment or re-
investment, or for any loss occurring through 
a so-called hazardous investment made by and 
with the consent of the settlor. 
The court concluded as follows: 
I t does seem to be futile to undertake to ex-
amine through the glasses of an expert the 
methods of a trustee who holds a patent of 
authority like this, and to call him to account 
for what we may even believe to be folly, if it 
stops short of fraud, when the testator has ex-
pressly absolved him from accountability. 
Third, and finally, Article V I I I provides that all 
acts in good faith are conclusive on all parties and in-
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terests. Such language should preclude recovery for in-
vestments made in good faith with full participation of 
the then beneficiaries. In re Cowles' Will, 255 N.Y.S. 
2d 567 (N.Y. App. 1965) aff. 215 N.E. 2d 509. In the 
trial court's remarks at the end of the presentation of 
evidence (R. 562) it was stated: 
I think all trustees are held to a standard of 
what in fact, everything they do know and 
everything they should know, constructively. 
. . . because no trustee is excused from the ex-
ercise of ordinary care and ordinary diligence. 
The court was questioned as to whether he found any 
dishonesty on the part of John Dussault (R. 576) and 
replied "Dishonesty only to the extent that he knew this 
was not the way he was supposed to run a trust by then." 
Although the court found bad faith, it did so on the 
basis of gross inattentiveness which it concluded was the 
equivalent of bad faith (R. 197, 11 14). The record does 
not support either finding of gross inattentiveness or 
bad faith. At best, the record will support speculative 
stock investment, and as can be seen from Point of this 
brief, much of the court's conclusion is predicated on the 
court's own sophistication, not the evidence of the rec-
ord. The evidence of record shows consultation with 
numerous investment counselors and stockbrokers, the 
actual submission of the trust instrument to Dean Witter 
and Company, the purchase of stocks rated by Standard 
and Poor and an effort to maximize the growth of the 
trust corpus which was respondents' predecessor's de-
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sire as was the expressed desire of the life beneficiary. 
At best, the evidence would only support a finding that 
some of the investments were speculative. This is insuf-
ficient to make out illegal investment, investments con-
trary to public policy or in the terms of the trust in-
strument bad faith. There is not one scintilla of evi-
dence to show inattentiveness. In fact, the evidentiary 
findings of the court do not show inattentiveness. The 
only trustees who were actively managing the trust 
were appellants. The trial court's findings of omission 
were against Donald Bowman, not the appellants. I t 
is respectfully submitted that as a matter of law when 
the trust instrument is viewed against the evidence of 
this record on appeal, that there is insufficient evidence 
to sustain the judgment. 
What has been said with reference to the trust in-
strument on the question of liability for investment 
policy is equally applicable to the claim of lack of di-
version. First National Bank v. Hyde, 363 S.W. 2d 647 
(Mo. 1962); Annotation 24 A L R 3d 730, 753. The 
broad latitude the trust instrument accorded the trus-
tees so far as investments are concerned would exonerate 
them from any liability for failure to diversify. Diversi-
fication is not a requisite where the trust instrument 
contemplates that the trustee may invest the property 
as their own and in effect are liable only for bad faith. 
Warren v. Pazolt, supra; North Adams National Bank 
v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932). 
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the 
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trust instrument immunizes the appellants from liabil-
ity. Trust instruments similar in nature to that in the 
instant case are often drawn so as to substantially limit 
the liability of trustees to family trusts where it is con-
templated that relatives of limited experience will have 
the management responsibility of the trust. To con-
strue the evidence in light of the trust instrument as 
imposing liability in this case would be to defeat the in-
tention of the settlor. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N TAK-
I N G J U D I C I A L N O T I C E OF T H E 
ECONOMIC E N V I R O N M E N T A N D 
O P E R A T I O N OF CONGLOMERATE 
CORPORATIONS IN T H E 1960s A N D 
T H A T A N Y I N T E L L I G E N T P E R S O N 
W O U L D NOT P U R C H A S E C E R T A I N 
C O N G L O M E R A T E STOCKS D U R I N G 
T H E T I M E I N QUESTION. 
After the conclusion of the presentation of evidence 
and after both sides had rested the trial judge purport-
ing to act under authority of Rule 9, Utah Rules of 
Evidence (URE) stated he proposed to take judicial 
notice "of what happened to the conglomerate in 1960's 
and I'll state what I believe it to be. . ." (Tr. 361). The 
trial judge stated the source of judicial notice to be "a 
recent reading of the Wall Street Journal." The judge 
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then proceeded to ntice, among other things, the follow-
ing: 
1. The manner in which conglomerate cor-
porations acquired companies including the 
general financial, accounting and tax write-
off practices, and tax bracket of corpora-
tions. 
2. The form of consideration given for cor-
porate acquisitions. 
3. That such practices resulted in L.T.V. 
(Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.) owing "hun-
dreds of millions of dollars" more for assets 
than they were worth. (Evidence had pre-
viously been received that the trust had 
acquired L.T.V. securities.) 
4. That writers were predicting that mergers 
would reduce the number of stocks on the 
New York Stock Exchange to ten within 
ten years (Tr. 362), and that "almost every 
stock on the stock exchange either enjoyed 
some type of merging and diversifica-
tion. . . " 
5. That ". . . volatile continuation of the tax 
structure brought on long-term capital 
gains" so that benefit could be received 
f r o m conglomerate acquisitions. The 
necessity "to enjoy reasonably a good busi-
ness era so they could pay their debts." The 
hope to "enjoy the continued laxity of gov-
ernment tax auditing." That the failure of 
such factors noticed "could have brought 
down the conglomerates; that the conglom-
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erates insofar as their stock values were 
concerned were destroyed primarily by 
political pressures against further mergers 
and by improved tax auditing." 
6. From 1968 to 1970, the "Federal Govern-
ernment issued regulations against mergers, 
filed actions against mergers," prevented 
mergers of corporations with sales over 100 
million a year. That such action "brought 
conglomerate stocks down," and "the 
dream of rapid growth" was destroyed. 
7. That the diversification of the present trust 
portfolio in Gulf and Western and L.T.V. 
stocks did not exist because it was "total-
ly dependent upon political favors." 
8. What destroyed conglomerates was "all the 
business executives and the Republican 
Party eventually realized that the merger 
of all of these companies would cause a com-
plete shift to all corporate executive posi-
tions and the pressure brought by the 
Federal Government affected the stock, 
and this is what happened through the 
sixties. I t is well known, and under rule 
nine the court takes judicial notice that 
this is what happened to the stocks. 
Any intelligent person through this 
period would not consider the purchase of 
L.T.V. and Gulf and Western as a diver-
sification because they depended on the 
same factors for success." 
These oral expressions of judicial notice were 
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carried over Paragraph 8 of the court's "Findings of 
Fact" where the court observed: 
"The court believes these facts to be of general 
knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute, 
and capable of accurate determination by re-
sort to easily accessible sources." 
Again, the court cited its "principal source of informa-
tion the Wall Street Journal. . ." The court then found: 
"A conglomerate would offer to buy another 
company for more than the actual value of 
that company. This was possible because of the 
permissive accounting procedures of that 
period; the conglomerate could write off as a 
tax deduction many of the costs of the pur-
chase, in effect the tax saving to the purchaser 
was buying the new company. Also, the buy-
ing and selling of corporations or their stocks 
in the light of loose accounting for the period 
permitted the transfer of large earnings to 
capital gains reports or time-wise fixing tax 
losses. Purchasing of stock and their own 
stock in large blocks permitted what amounted 
to price fixing of stocks or securities. The pur-
chase was generally effected by a transfer of 
stocks, bonds and indentures and warrants were 
often used. In this way a large conglomerate 
could owe more for the assets than the assets 
were worth, but as long as business conditions 
and tax practices continued, and federal regu-
lations remained favorable the conglomerate 
could successfully operate and continue to 
acquire other companies. 
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These companies had much in common. 
They depended for their existence upon con-
tinuation of the existing tax structure, a 
reasonably good business climate, and con-
tinued laxity of federal tax auditing standards 
and market manipulation of stocks or securities. 
The failure of any of these conditions would 
seriously affect the value of all of the conglome-
rates. Any knowledgeable person would have 
realized that investment in conglomerates was 
not by itself diversification. Even though dif-
ferent business were involved, their stock prices 
and variations paralleled one another to an 
extremely high degree. The conglomerates were 
usually 'leveraged' to the maximum. They 
were therefore highly speculative, and while 
this could hold some of their stock, to further 
'leverage' by placing them on the margin con-
stituted misconduct and this includes the stock 
of Gulf & Western." 
I t is submitted the court acted improperly in taking 
judicial notice of substance of the court's statements 
and in making a finding thereon and procedurally in 
the action itself. 
Rule 9 provides for three situations in which the 
court may by judicial notice of matters of general 
knowledge obtain evidence in support of a judgment. 
Rule 9(1) provides that judicial notice shall be taken 
"of such specific facts and propositions of generalized 
knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot 
reasonably be the subject of dispute." That provision 
would seem to make mandatory that a trial judge con-
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sider those items as that are so obvious that they are, 
without question, uncontestable. Such a fact might be 
that the State of Utah is one of the fifty States of the 
United States. Section 9(2) provides that judicial notice 
may be taken without request by a party of "(d) such 
facts as are so generally known or of such common 
notoriety within the territorial jurisdiction of the court 
that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute, 
and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized 
knowledge which are capable of immediate and accurate 
determination by resort to easily accessible sources of 
indisputable accuracy." The third situation is the same 
as 9(2) (d) and (e) but upon request of a party. 9(3) 
U.R.E. 
The trial judge purported to use language similar 
to Rule 9 in taking judicial notice of the material above 
described and in making his finding. I t is submitted 
that Rule 9 so far as the specific facts as are so generally 
known or of such common notoriety that they cannot 
be reasonably subject to dispute or generalized knowl-
edge capable of immediate and accurate determination 
is using terminology very comparable to that expressed 
in Little Cottonwood Water Company v. Kent, 76 Utah 
243, 289 Pac. 116 (1930) at page 267, where this court 
noted that matters of general geography, history, agri-
cultural conditions and matters of common knowledge 
could be the subject of judicial notice. "In short, the 
court is presumed to know what every man of ordinary 
intelligence must know about such things." I t is sub-
mitted that the action of the court in taking judicial 
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notice of the variant and detailed matters that were 
noticed in the instant case in effect exceeded the stand-
ard demonstrated in Rule 9 and made the Wall Street 
Journal a hearsay expert witness. 
I t is submitted that the trial court confused the 
concept of judicial notice with judicial knowledge. In 
Wigmore on Evidence, Section 2569, 3rd Edition, it 
is observed: 
" There is a real but elusive line between the 
judge's personal knowledge as a private man 
and these matters of which he takes judicial 
notice as a judge. The latter does not neces-
sarily include the former; as a judge, indeed, 
he may have to ignore what he knows as a man, 
and contrariwise. 
"I t is therefore plainly accepted that the 
judge is not to use from the bench, under the 
guise of judicial knowledge, that which he 
knows only as an individual observed outside 
of court. The former is in truth 'known' to 
him merely in the fictional sense that it is 
known and notorious to all men, and the 
dilemma is only the result of using the term 
'knowledge' in two senses. Where to draw the 
line between knowledge by notoriety and 
knowledge by personal observation may some-
times be difficult, but the principle is plain." 
Even though a judge may have expertise in a particular 
area, he cannot, himself, become a witness in the pro-
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ceedings and use his expertise through the concept of 
judicial notice to bolster a finding. Bervid v. The Taw 
Commission, 247 Iowa 1333, 78 N.W. 2d 812 (1956). 
In Miranne v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance, 54 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1951), the court ruled 
that the trial judge was in error in taking notice that a 
certain street in New Orleans had heavy automobile 
traffic. The court stated judicial knowledge is limited 
to what a judge may properly know in his judicial 
capacity. Cf. In re Duarte, 331 Mass. 747,122 N.E. 2d 
890 (1954); Castello v. Cassidy, 210 N.Y. Supp. 2d 46 
(1960). In State v. Martel, 122 Ver. 421, 177 A.2d 
236 (1962), the court ruled that the internal affairs of 
a private corporation could not be properly judicially 
noticed. In the instant case, the trial judge took judicial 
notice of the financial status of L.T.V. Corporation 
which could only involve notice of its internal financial 
structure. I t is hardly a matter of common knowledge 
to the public at large. The United States Congress 
Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Represen-
tatives did not feel that the matter concerning L.T.V., 
Inc. was a matter of such common knowledge as would 
allow them to legislate concerning conglomerates with-
out taking substantial evidence from numerous wit-
nesses. The Committee held hearings before the House 
Antitrust Subcommittee on the Investigation of Con-
glomerate Corporations Serial Number 91-23 Part 6, 
91s£ Congress, 2nd Session 1970, which was devoted 
to consideration of Ling-Temco-Vought. The printed 
investigation dealing with mergers and acquisitions runs 
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781 pages. Under such circumstances, it could hardly 
be said that the action of the trial court was in keeping 
with the concept that judicial notice will be taken of 
matters of common knowledge as distinct from what 
experties the trial judge may have acquired in his own 
day-today association with the world finance. 
In In re Phillips Estate, 86 Utah 358, 44 P.2d 699 
(1935), the court held that judicial notice could not be 
taken in probate proceedings that certain streets were 
in a certain city and their location to one another. If 
something of that nature is not the subject of judicial 
notice, how can the whole ambit of conglomerate opera-
tions be of such common knowledge. Miller v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P.2d 865 (1933). 
In Walker Brothers v. Skilirs, 43 Utah 353, 98 
Pac. 114 (1908), this court refused to take judicial 
notice of different systems of bookkeeping. Certainly, 
if judicial notice of such a matter is prohibited judicially 
noticing a means of corporate acquisition by conglome-
rates in general or tax accounting methods and their 
income position is beyond that of a trial court. Salt Lake 
City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 Pac. 442 (1911). 
Nor does the fact that Rule 9 authorizes judicial notice 
of a fact that is readily verifiable apply in this instance. 
The facts which the court took judicial notice of that 
led to the conclusion that no reasonable man would 
invest in conglomerates for diversification is hardly a 
matter that can be ascertained with reasonable certainty. 
The hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the 
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expertise the trial judge may have acquired in his own 
Committee of the Judiciary of the House of Representa-
tives, 91st Congress on Gulf and Western Industries, 
Inc., a corporation which the trial court took judicial 
notice as to its internal activities and financial condition 
runs 819 pages and involves substantial detailed infor-
mation concerning the corporation. The overall proceed-
ings on conglomerate corporations conducted by the 
House of Representatives run into seven volumes and in 
excess of 7000 pages, testimony and exhibits. I t could 
hardly be said that the conclusions reached by the court 
are readily ascertainable. See 1 Jones on Evidence, Sec-
tion 2:3 and 2:4. The matter in which the trial court took 
judicial notice can hardly be within the common knowl-
edge generally of persons in the State of Utah nor 
readily ascertainable by resort to "easily accessible 
sources of indisputable accuracy." McCormick on Evi-
dence, 2nd Ed. Section 330, page 763. 
Further, it is necessary to distinguish between what 
may be legislatively known and what are adjudicative 
facts. Legislative facts may be a part of the judicial 
arsenal in giving consideration to the adoption of new 
laws or the expression of new legal policies, but are not 
adjudicative facts which may be noticed relating to an 
incident which may give rise to a lawsuit. McCormick 
on Evidence, 3rd Ed. Section 331, page 767. As the 
court observed in Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 
229 N.W. 138 (1930)". . . we cannot take judicial notice 
of such facts as are known only by an especially informed 
class of persons." The evidence noticed in this case is 
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hardly scientific fact capable of ready ascertainment 
known to a community of scholors. 
In addition, it is submitted that even if the matter 
noticed by the court were the proper subject for judicial 
notice that the procedure employed by the court was not 
proper under the circumstances. The parties had rested 
their case and the matter was in effect submitted subject 
to additional memoranda. The court indicated that it 
intended to take judicial notice of the items noted above 
and that the parties could put in their memoranda their 
disagreement with the court's action. The court referred 
to its informational base as being a "recent article" in 
the Wall Street Journal. How recent or the date of the 
article was not specified. Rule 10, Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, provides that the court shall afford each party 
reasonable opportunity to present information relevant 
to the propriety of judicial notice and allows, under 
Rule 10(2) (a), in determining the propriety of taking 
a judicial notice, the judge to consult any source of 
pertinent information. The source is not to be evidence 
itself but only to determine the propriety of taking 
judicial notice. Further, the information must convince 
the judge that the matter falls clearly within his per-
ogratives under Rule 9, Rule 10(3) Utah Rules of 
Evidence. In the instant case, the trial judge used a 
hearsay newspaper article as an expert witness against 
the defendants. This court in promulgating the Utah 
Rules of Evidence did not adopt the provisions of the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(31) on learned 
treatises which would allow judicial notice to prove the 
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truth of a matter by published treatises, periodicals or 
pamplets on history, science or art. Even if this court 
had that rule, it would not cover the instant situation. 
Nor does § 78-25-6 U.C.A. 1953, apply to newspaper 
articles. The Wall Street Journal can hardly be called 
a book of science, art or historical work. Since the news-
paper article itself would be inadmissible in evidence, 
it was not proper for the trial court under the guise of 
judicial notice to accept such matter as evidence. Anno. 
55 A L R 3rd 663; Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 
790 (2nd Cir. 1962). The court in effect made a hearsay 
newspaper article and his own reading an expert witness 
against appellants not subject to cross-examination. In 
the instant case, the effect of the court's erroneous 
taking of judicial notice was to sum up appellant's 
conglomerate ventures as a basis for liability. The re-
spondents own expert witness testified that Gulf and 
Western had a B + rating based on Standard and Poor's 
rating system and that the purchase of such stock would 
be reasonable as a part of a total portfolio (T. 158-
159). The court's judicial notice finding apparently was 
the basis for a contrary conclusion. The finding made 
by the court was directly related to the judgment later 
entered. Under these circumstances, the action was 
clearly reversible error. 
P O I N T I I I 
T H E T R I A L COURT C O M M I T T E D 
E R R O R IN I M P O S I N G L I A B I L I T Y 
A G A I N S T T H E A P P E L A N T S A N D 
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I N FAVOR OF T H E R E S P O N D E N T S 
SINCE W I L L I A M BOWMAN E X E -
C U T E D A R E L E A S E O F L I A B I L I T Y 
A G A I N S T T H E A P P E L L A N T S . 
William Bowman was the father of the respondents. 
He was not a trustee but was one of the beneficiaries 
of the trust. Bowman had been consulted from time to 
time on investments and because of some difficulties 
within the family was sometimes antagonistic to the 
appellants. Mr. Bowman contacted the Dussaults and 
indicated he was in financial difficulty and needed some 
money (R. 538). He indicated that he was sorry to have 
caused trouble but did need to borrow some money. He 
indicated to the Dussaults that he would be glad to sign 
any kind of instrument releasing the Dussaults from 
any liability with reference to the trust. Defendants' 
exhibit 6 is a realease and confirmation signed by Wil-
liam Bowman, the Dussaults and Donald Bowman and 
purported to release the Dussaults of all claims against 
the Dussaults as a result of their actions as trustees. 
The release acknowledges that William Bowman had 
full opportunity to review all transactions relating to 
the trust. Further, William Bowman did not allege 
that the appellants had ever been guilty of negligence 
or wrongdoing with reference to the trust but expressly 
confirmed that the appellants had acted at all times in 
a proper manner. William Bowman was an attorney and 
was well aware of the effect of the document he signed. 
The release and confirmation was executed May 4,1970, 
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subsequent to the actions which the court found had given 
rise to the respondents' claims for relief. I t is submitted 
that the release acted as a release of liability and a con-
firmation of what had been done and that respondents 
are bound by the release. The respondents are simply 
contingent beneficiaries. They stand to receive what 
their father would have received had he survived. Under 
such circumstances, it is submitted that the respondents' 
position with reference to the trust is in privity with the 
actions that their father took. Section 217(1) of the 
Restatement of Trusts 2d provides: 
A beneficiary may preclude himself from 
holding the trustees liable for a breach of trust 
by a release or contract effective to discharge 
the trustee's liability to him for that breach. 
The Restatement of Trusts 2d § 218(1) provides: 
Except as stated in Subsection (2), if the 
trustee in breach of trust enters into a trans-
action which the beneficiary can at his option 
reject or affirm, and the beneficiary affirms 
the transaction, he cannot thereafter reject it 
and hold the trustee liable for any loss occur-
ring after the trustee entered into the trans-
action. 
Defendants' Exhibit 6 constituted a release and confir-
mation of the actions of the appellants. I t was executed 
by a professional man knowledgeable in what he was 
doing after having had an opportunity to thoroughly 
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review the investment activities of the appellants. In 
54 Am.Jur., Trusts § 379 it is stated: 
The general rule that approval, consent, or 
ratification by a beneficiary, who is an adult 
sui juris, of a step or transaction in the ad-
ministration of a trust, made freely, or acquie-
scense thereto for a long time, with full knowl-
edge of all pertinent facts and circumstances, 
operates as an estoppel, waiver, or preclusion, 
with respect to any right of the beneficiary to 
object to the impropriety of such step or trans-
action, applies fully and is frequently invoked 
with respect to the impropriety of trust invest-
ments, whether such impropriety lies in the 
making, retention, or exchange of investments, 
or whether it lies in the making of the invest-
ments in so-called 'nonlegal securities,' in the 
taking of the investments in the name of the 
trustee, or in other matters. 
The trial court in Finding No. 10 (R. 195) found that 
the release was not a valid release on behalf of Bowman's 
heirs, the respondents herein. I t is submitted that the 
above doctrine should be applied in instances where the 
ultimate beneficiaries are merely contingent and take 
per stripes. The motivation behind the release is im-
material if it is made knowingly when not under inca-
pacity. The facts and circumstances of record in this 
case show that Bowman approached the appellants 
seeking the release in excange for a loan. Under such 
circumstances, the release and confirmation immunizes 
the appellants from any liability to Bowman or those 
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who are in privity to his action. An individual is in 
privity with another when there is a mutual or successive 
relationship to the same rights of property. Black's 
Law Dictionary, 4th ed. p. 1361. A derivative interest 
founded on or growing out of contract, connection or 
bond of union between the parties is sufficient. I t is 
submitted that in the instant case respondents were in 
privity of estate with the interests of William Bowman 
and that the release and confirmation executed by Wil-
liam Bowman should preclude liability in the instant 
action. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N NOT 
A L L O W I N G A P P E L L A N T S TO O F F -
S E T G A I N S A G A I N S T LOSSES I N 
D E T E R M I N I N G T H E M E A S U R E OF 
D A M A G E S . 
Assuming that the trial court's findings of liability 
are upheld by this court, it is submitted that reversal is 
still required. The trial court did not allow the appel-
lants to offset gains to the estate as against losses. The 
evidence discloses that appellants, as trustees, engaged 
in margin investments from about 1965 (R. 300). The 
trial court computed the damages in the instant case 
against the appellants based upon the years 1968, 1969 
and 1970 (R. 195). No allowances were made for gains 
from the same investments in prior years or during the 
same years (Exhibit D ) . The court imposed damages 
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based upon a finding of mismanagement for the amount 
of the losses to the investment portfolio without refer-
ence to whether a profit had been made from the invest-
ment practices. I t is submitted that such a measure of 
damages was inappropriate in the instant case. The 
testimony of respondents' expert, Robert Gevens, was 
to the effect that there was a need to diversify and that 
the type of investment was proper only if following a 
very aggressive approach (R. 354, 356). He also ac-
knowledged that there had been a profit in the years 
1965 through 1967 to as much as $200,000 by purchasing 
on the margin (R. 375, 376). The trial court, however, 
accepted only the loss years for calculating damages 
even though the testimony of respondents' expert was 
to the effect that the investment practices simply con-
tinued beyond the profitable period (R. 376). I t is 
submitted that this is not a proper standard for measur-
ing the damages and that appellants should have been 
allowed to offset their gains as against their losses since 
a trustee is not an insurer of the trust investment. In 
re Listmans Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac. 596 (1921). 
A. Gains Against Losses 
The general rule is stated in the Restatement of 
Trusts 2d I 213: 
A trustee who is liable for a loss occasioned by 
one breach of trust cannot reduce the amount 
of his liability by deducting the amount of a 
gain which was accrued through another and 
distinct breach of trust; but if the two breaches 
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of trust are not distinct, the trustee is account-
able only for the net gain or chargeable only 
with the net loss resulting therefrom. (Empha-
sis added). 
It should be noted that normally a trustee who has in-
curred liability by reason of a breach of duty regarding 
investments cannot reduce his liability by demonstrating 
that other separate legal or illegal conduct resulted in 
a profit for the trust. Bogart, Trusts and Trustees, 2d 
ed. § 708. However, as the Restatement acknowledges 
and will be seen hereinafter in certain instances appli-
cable to the instant case, gains can be credited against 
losses, Thus, the Restatements position acknowledges 
that if the breaches of trust are not distinct, the trustee 
is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only 
with the net loss resulting therefrom. In Comment (1), 
the Restatement of Trusts 2d observes: 
If property is improperly purchased by the 
trustee and is subsequently sold, and the pro-
ceeds are used in purchasing other property 
in breach of trust, the trustee is accountable 
only for the net profit or is chargeable only 
with the net loss if the purchases are not dis-
tinct breaches of trust. Thus, if the trustee, 
erroneously believing that he can properly 
invest trust funds in the purchase of land, pur-
chases a farm which he sells at a profit and with 
the proceeds immediately purchases another 
farm which he sells at a loss, he is accountable 
only for the net profit or chargeable only with 
the net loss. Conversely, if the first farm were 
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sold at a loss and the second farm at a profit, 
the trustee is accountable only for the net profit 
or is chargeable only with the net loss. 
This is in accord with the general principle that where 
the breach of trust is of one investment activity, gains 
may be set off against losses. A similar conclusion is 
reached in Comment (j) of the Restatement of Trusts 
2d where it is observed: 
If the trustee in breach of trust continues to 
carry on the business of the testator and for a 
time makes a profit but thereafter incurs 
losses, leaving a small profit at the end of the 
period, he is liable only for the ultimate profit; 
he is not chargeable with the intermediate 
profit without deducting the subsequent loss. 
In Mclnnes v. Goldthwaite, 94 N .H. 331, 52 A.2d 
795 (1947) the court observed : 
The trustee who has incurred liability by reason 
of a breach of duty regarding investments 
cannot reduce that liability by proving that he 
has made a profit for the trust by other sepa-
rate legal or illegal conduct in the trust admin-
istration. . . . But a different situation arises if 
the trustee violates his investment obligations 
by means of a single act which to some extent 
produces losses and in other ways results in 
gains, and it is sought to hold the trustee liable 
for the losses and also to take from him the 
gains, whereas the trustee asserts that the trans-
action should be viewed as a whole and that he 
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should be credited with gains which he can off-
set against the damages which accrued. 
See also Restatement of Trusts 2d § 213 (f ) : 
There are other situations also in which the 
losses may be setoff against the gains on the 
ground that there are not separate and distinct 
breaches of trust. Thus if the trustee in breach 
of trust purchases at one time several securi-
ties of the same general character, and subse-
quently sells some of them at a profit and 
others at a loss he is accountable only for the 
net profit or is chargeable with the net loss. 
The argument is most persuasive that losses ought 
not to be treated separate from gains. As is observed in 
Buer, Qualified Trustee Performance, 99 Trusts and 
Estates, 194-195 (1960): 
One of the greatest handicaps to prudent trust 
investment procedure is inability of trustees 
to present both sides of a transaction in justi-
fying sale of purchase. Insistence by the courts 
that each transaction stand on its own feet is 
inconsistent with good investment principles 
and practices. I t penalizes diversification, the 
basic principle of which is that gains will offset 
an occasional inevitable loss. 
The effect of a contrary rule in the instant case would 
be to allow the trustee to have invested in mutual funds 
that purchased the exact same stocks purchased by the 
trustees without incurring liability; but if they pur-
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chased the same stocks purcliased by the mutual fund 
without going through the mutual fund, gains could not 
he setoff as against iubbuD. Comment, 1972 U. of 111. 
f ,'iw Forum 784. 
I n the instant ease, i! is submitted the appellants 
'-^ild he allo\\<d lo ofiesi I in- losses from the years 
s through 1970 as against the gains mad* m the same 
of invrshnenf actively <*md similar investment 
practices in prioi ) ears since they were a par t of the 
same investment activity involving one single policy. 
I n Bogart , Trust mid Trustees, 2d < i:l § 708 p. IW 
it is observed: 
Ti . - . question regarding the law as 
to pi til it ^ ;III.I i-vses from separate, distinct 
transactions m \\\wA\ the trustee engages, 
whether they are uii noniegai or 11e par t ly 
legal and parti}' n<mlegal. Bu t a different 
situation arises if the trustee violates his in-
vestment obligations by means of a single act 
which to some extent produces losses and in 
other ways results in gains, and it is sought 
to hold the trustee liable for the losses and also 
to take from him the gains, whereas the trustee 
asserts that the transaction should be viewed 
as a whole and that he should be credited with 
gains which he can offset against the damages 
whi«"h acrrnrd 
• •r example, suppose a truster violates 
his trust by purchasing a! KAW lime and from 
the same seller a block of speculative stock, and 
later at various times he sells the io L \n 
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a gain, Or let it be assumed that his breach 
consists of the purchase of a tract of land, 
a part of which is sold at a loss, but that oil 
is discovered on the remainder of the land 
later and this enables the trustee to sell the 
rest of the realty at a greatly advanced price, 
so that the whole transaction is highly advan-
tageous to the beneficiaries. 
I t would seem here that the cestui must 
choose between repudiating the transaction 
and treating it as unlawful, or on the other 
hand electing to treat it as valid as a whole, 
and that he cannot disaffirm the act of the 
trustee in part and treat it as valid in part. 
And if he takes the first choice the damages 
flowing from the breach should be based on the 
net effect of the operation. 
Since the trial court did not apply the appropriate stand-
ard of damages or even give consideration in the 
findings as to whether under the rules above expressed 
gains should be setoff as against losses, it is submitted 
that a new trial is warranted. The evidence clearly 
demonstrates that the trial court found the entire port-
folio to have been improperly managed in the particular 
years before referenced (R. 195). 
P O I N T V 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N IM-
P O S I N G L I A B I L I T Y A G A I N S T T H E 
A P P E L L A N T S F O R T H E R E N O 
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R A N (' J i - A 111 IU > 111' T K AN S A C T K )N 
S I N C E (A) T H E M A T T i i R W A S N O T 
P R O P E R L Y R A I S E D (H) R E S P O N -
D E N T S H A D NO S T A N D I N G T O 
C O M P L A I N (C) T H E E V I D E N C E 
W A S I N S U F F I C I E N T T O S U S T A I N 
T H E J U D G M E N T A N D ( D ) S T A T -
U T E O F L I M I T A T I O N S IT AD E X -
P I R E D . 
The trial court imposed liability against the appel-
lants for a transaction between Estella Wat t i s Bowman, 
one of the trustees to the trust and the life beneficiary, 
and John Dussault, also a trustee. I n 1961, appellant 
.John Dussault traded property known as the airport 
property fti Keno. Nevada to Estella Watt is Bowman 
in exchange for property that .she mwk-d known as the 
Reno Ranch property. The transaction u ^ independent 
of the trust and neither the Reno Ran eh propeit\ nor 
the airport property was at the time in any way con-
nected with the trust. Mrs. Bowman subsequently trans-
ferred the airport property to the trust in 1964 (R. 340). 
The trial eour <n a.* unsupportable conclusion found 
that John Dussauli misled Estella Wat t i s Bowman as 
to the value of the property being exchanged (R. ; *r . 
H i s finding was apparently that Mr. Dussault misled 
Mrs. Bowman as to the value of her own property, and 
that although the propeiiy had !;een appraised U*r 
$95,000 that shortly after I he exchange Mr. Du.vsault 
was aide lu sell tin i^"-!i^' '"• b{ revcived for appmxi-
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mately $120,000 and that, therefore, he should be ac-
countable for the difference between the $120,000 and 
the value of the property he gave to Mrs. Bowman. 
The property which was exchanged for the Ranch prop-
erty was income producing property and provided Mrs. 
Bowman with approximately $750 to $1000 per month 
income whereas the Ranch property produced only 
enough money to cover the taxes of the property. The 
court found that since Mrs. Bowman subsequently 
transferred the airport property to the trust in 1964 
that by reason of the transaction the trust suffered a 
loss of $24,200 (R. 197). The court also found that at 
the time of the transaction, Mrs. Bowman was fully 
competent (R. 197). With these findings, the court 
allowed the contingent beneficiaries of the trust to main-
tain a cause of action in their own name to recover from 
John Dussault the profit he made when he subsequently 
sold the property he had received from Mrs. Bowman. 
I t is submitted that this matter was not properly raised 
by the pleadings, that the respondents have no cause 
of action arising out of the transaction, that the evidence 
is insufficient to establish a claim for relief and that 
the statute of limitations on any claim for relief has run. 
A. The Matter was not Properly Raised. 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures 
provides: 
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
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eumslair.V; eoir,i;Uuin:^' 1'rauu or mistake snail 
be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, ami ofber condition *»!' neud of a 
person imv be avi rred generally., 
I.i ilk" instant <av ih«- complaint, aim-ruled complaint, 
and complaint In intervention in no uay plead fraud 
with any degree of particularity. Tne Heno Ranch-Air-
port property transaction was not even mentioned in the 
pleadings. Consequently, it is submitted that since the 
pleadings fail to adequately plead fraud that no action 
MI such a theory can he sustained by the status of the 
record in the instant -aase. Heathman V. Hatch. 13 Utah 
2d 266, 372 J ' . ^ I : m (1962); Heathman
 : luthmu. 
14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2< 1 189 (1 962;, Although ii.-
pretrial order mentions the Reno Ranch matter in ilk-
contentions of the plaintiffs (R. 119, 121) that does 
not take the place of a proper pleading. Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of ( n i l Procedure provides that the pretrial order 
•Jiall indicali ih/' amendments allowed u, the pleadings 
or the agreements made by iln partic:-. ^ to \\w matters 
considered. The pretrial order contains no agreements 
as to the parties, no statement of agreed facts with refer-
ence to this issue and no amendments to the pleadings. 
Consequently, if respondents are to maintain their re-
cowry agjim>i the appellants, it must be on the basis 
of the tlieory plead m UK; amended complaint that assets 
of "thr trust estate" were lost by neglect and the failure 
to properly discharge the duties of trustee (R. I : '•. Since 
this was not the case as to this issue, the judgment must 
be reduced. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
B. The Respondents are Without Standing with 
Reference to the Reno Ranch Transaction. 
I t is submitted that the respondents have no stand-
ing or any right to recover with reference to the transfer 
of the airport property for the Reno Ranch property. 
The transfer was not a part of the trust and it was not 
until 1964, some three years after the transfer, that the 
property involved which was the property of Mrs. Bow-
man, was actually given over to the trust. If there was 
any wrongdoing, it was directed at Mrs. Bowman, not 
at the trust. She, if anyone, would have a cause of action 
or her estate would have a cause of action. The benefici-
aries of the trust are only entitled to the assets of the 
trust or damages from trust mismanagement not un-
related claims. See generally, 54 Am.Jur., Trusts § 378. 
They are not entitled to represent Mrs. Bowman's 
estate for any action it might have against appellants. 
The pretrial order recited as one of the appellants' con-
tentions that appellants as heirs of law of Estella Wattis 
Bowman were entitled to directly sue to recover for the 
estate the losses of their ancestor. (R. 121). Such a 
contention is without merit. The person who has the 
power to represent the estate of Estella Wattis Bow-
man is the executor or administrator of that estate. 
§ 75-11-3, 4, 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The assets 
of any action brought by the estate would have to be 
distributed in accordance with the will of the deceased, 
if there was one, or by intestate succession. The appel-
lants as contingent beneficiaries of a specific trust have 
no general right to represent the estate. 
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F i i r iho \w instant a^Uun were deemed U> •«. 
on.- tti' fraud m the Reno Ranch transaction whether 
UM- la"<* «>f r ia l ) or ih^
 ;.,v- -tj' .Nevada i.s applied, both 
States recognize the general applicability of the English 
Common Law. $ f>:*-.'M. O a h i*ode Annotated, 1953; 
§ 1.030 Nevada Revised Statutes. A t common law, 
actions in fraud do not survive the death of the defrauded 
party. I n 1 Am.Ju r . 2d Abatement, § 92, it is stated: 
A t common law, according to the general rule 






 Abatement and Revival § 1 k,\ it Is stated: 
A t common iav. a *4anse of nrilwn fur I'nt.in and 
deceit does nol MHMVC the dc;dh of either 
o:^ty. See also II cash aw v. Miller, 17 How. 
i' 212 (1854) 
l i i.s s u o i r n U ' d tha 1 ;!is ; * a u s e of a ( l i " n ina i K s l c l l a 
Wattis Bowman might haw had. to the extent u-d -,\ 
is predicated upon fraud, ended at the time of her death. 
Jliven so, respondents could not claim the cause of action 
§ 75-11-4, Utah Code Anne)tated, 1953. It is only ilu 
barest speculation to assume that Mrs. Bowman might 
;:av. donated am recovery dial she might have had in 
an action agamsl John l)u-sand '..- (J.< t rud . The n 
spondents in this case are no; representatives of the 
estate of Estella Watt is Bowman and since the trans-
action took place prior to any of the property going 
into the trust and took place under circumstances where 
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neither party was purporting to represent the trust with 
no expression of donative intent made at the time of the 
transaction, the respondents simply had no standing 
with reference to any cause of action relating to the 
transaction. 
C. Insufficiency of Evidence 
In reference to the Reno-Airport property trans-
action, the trial court found "that John Dussault mis-
led Estella Wattis Bowman in 1961 as to the value of 
the property being exchanged." (R. 197). The court 
also found that John Dussault's corporation received 
$120,000 from the transaction and that Estella Wattis 
Bowman received property in exchange of a value of 
$95,800. The court found that by reason of the trans-
action the trust suffered a loss of $24,200. The court 
noted that at the time of the transaction, Estella Bow-
man was fully competent (R. 197). I t is submitted 
that there is no evidence to sustain any basis of recovery 
by Estella Wattis Bowman against John Dussault out 
of the transaction and that under the circumstances there 
was no evidence to support a claim of liability in favor of 
respondents against appellants. Donald Bowman, one 
of the trustees, but not a trustee at the time of the trans-
action nor a person against whom liability was deter-
mined by the trial court arising out of the property 
transaction, testified that the transaction was fully ex-
plained to him by John Dussault (R. 285). He, Bow-
man, felt that upon an explanation of the transaction 
he could see nothing that was deterimental (R. 285). 
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f i r ;ifkn'>'.ried#cu liiai tiie Reno Ranch transaction was 
.-.•••I A ;MM! (»f the trust estate involved in the instant 
litigation i H 2 H > ; . Tint litere was a direct trade of 
tin- airj>orl io;id properly for ihe ranch property and that 
three years later hi.s mother. Estella Watt is Bowman, 
transferred the airport property to the trust estate (R. 
z&i>). A t the time of the transfer, the airport property 
was owned In Ji.lm Dussault and was making income 
of $75o :: )i;ontIi (R. 430) and was not transferred to 
\hi tn.Nf ut.;>l i!»bi ;H i\}\,. I he actual date of the 
transfer o) the ranch property io the iro-f was J anua ry 
28, nx;j. (Defendants Exhibit n "M^ transfer of 
the property from Estella Bowman to appellant !> 
Dussault 's corporation was June 22. I9<>] (Plaintiffs 
Kxhihii L) . The transfer of the ranch property for 
the airport property was a straight across transfer (R. 
32~j . „\i tin iim< the r:nuh properiv was not providing 
much income - about enough to eover (axes -, t{. 111)/. 
There was an appraisal made of the property transferred 
by John Dussault to Mrs. Bowman which was commer-
cial property (Plaintiffs' Exhibit L ) . Donald Bowman. 
William Bowman, Mrs. Dussault and Mrs. Bowman all 
went to Reno to examine noils properties (R. 337) Mr. 
Dussault testified iiia! :<n appraisal had been made of 
Mrs. Bowman's property and thai sin ua- contacted 
at the E l Cortez Hote l and advised that the property 
was worth approximately $88,000. The airport road 
property appraisal was for $95,800 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
M : R. 339). At the time Mrs. Bowmsm wr<s strapped 
l o r J i lCOIIU r i o ^ ! l ) : J " , M ' - ' " • O ' f U - ' p ^ f r H ' . ' W f ) ] | ] i ] | ) | - o ~ 
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vide her with income (R. 405). Mr. Dussault testified 
that at the time the ranch was unproductive and that 
he discussed the matter with real estate brokers and had 
received evaluations from $90,000 to $110,000 (R. 335). 
Mrs. Bowman, while fully competent, approached John 
Dussault and requested the transfer of the property. 
She was a woman capable of managing a sizeable estate 
of her own and the trust involved in this litigation. The 
trial court expressly found that she was an able and 
strong willed woman (R. 192). There is not one scin-
tilla of evidence to show any misrepresentation by John 
Dussault as to the transaction. Mrs. Bowman had her 
own appraisals and was certainly aware of the value of 
her own property including the difficulties associated 
with flooding of the property and the limited return 
from it. The trial court, in effect, found liability upon 
the part of John Dussault for misleading Estella Bow-
man as to the value of her own property although she 
had gone to Reno and examined the property, consulted 
independent individuals and herself requested the trans-
fer. The property was subsequently sold to Dr. Tom 
Mullis (Deposition of Tom Mullis, p. 3) and at the 
time he received the property, it was renting for just 
enough to pay the taxes (Deposition, p. 12). The mar-
ket for the property was not active. I t is submitted that 
under the evidence presented to the court as a matter 
of law there is insufficient evidence to support the court's 
findings of liability against John Dussault. I t should 
be remembered that there was no fiduciary relationship 
between the two and each were reasonably experienced 
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in 'mvness anairs . 1 in <*• .-< :i - -. MU-. .> \ : :iw\ 
representation. Under tin law of both the State of 
Nevada a n ; 'lit- State of I'tali, the e\ idence will •.- * 
sustain a finding of liability based <>H ,m\ theory of 
fraud assuming that this was the legal basis upon which 
the coi irt acted. 
Whether the evidence is evaluated under the law 
of the State of Nevada where the transaction occurred 
or under the State of Utah, the same standard is appli-
cable to fraud cases. The respondents had to prove their 
case by clear and convincing evidence. Nevada Mining 
and Exploration Co, v. Hae, 218 Par. ti\) i \ * \ . 192:*) : 
Ward v, Scheeline Banking <<nd TIU*I Company Ti 
P.2d 358 (Nev. 1933) ; HHVUH v. Alger, 461 P.2d 857 
(Nev. 1969); Chammui v. Troy Laundry, 47 P.2d 1054 
(Utah 1935); liavoson r. Hardy, 88 Utah 131, 48 J\2<1 
473 (1935); Universal CIT v. Schom, id L'lah 2d 202, 
381 P.2d 293 (1964). Respondents had the duty to prove 
any fraud of the appellant- * y more than a mere pre-
ponderance. I t had to be dear, convincing and satisfac-
tory. Where there is no evidence of anything other than 
a subsequent transfer of the property after John Dus-
sault received the same from Mrs. Bowman with the 
transfer being at a higher value from that which he 
paid i'^r il, f;."ti<! i- not established. Under both the law 
of the State of Utah and the law of the State of Nevada, 
fraud will not be presumed. Havas v. Alger, supra, p . 
880 P.2d.; Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 
374 (1926). Nor is it presumed where there is a reason-
able explanation other than, that of fn> ».* \ !>'* * . I ..* 
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Ozocerite, 38 Utah 367, 113 Pac. 1038 (1911). The 
evidence of record shows that John Dussault dealt at 
arms length and that he did not have any collusive deal-
ings with his subsequent vendor. The explanation is 
simply that John Dussault was able to find a buyer for 
property that he did not need but would return a profit 
for him in exchange for property transferred to Mrs. 
Bowman that satisfied her needs for cash income and 
was of reasonably comparable value. The mere fact that 
profit is made in a subsequent or contemporaneous 
transfer of the exchanged property does not make out 
fraud. Even assuming John Dussault had given his 
opinion of the value of the property at less than what 
he believed it to be, this would be insufficient to sustain 
a claim of fraud under the law of the State of Nevada. 
In Clark Sanitation, Inc. v. Sun Valley Disposal Co., 
487 P.2d 337 (Nev. 1971), the court observed: 
This is the basis for the frequently announced 
rule that a charge of fraud normally may not 
be based upon representations of value. In a 
differing context Nevada has recognized that 
expressions of opinion as distinguished from 
representations of fact, may not be the pre-
dicate for a charge of fraud (citations omit-
ted). 
This is in accord with the law as it has been in the 
majority of jurisdictions in this country for some time. 
In Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brewing Co., 54 Mass. 185, 
28 N.E. 151 (1891) in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
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Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Si ipreme Court, it 
was observed: 
Next as to fraud. Pimm facie, a statement 
to an experienced dealer in hops as to the 
market value of the article he is asked to buy 
is dealer's talk on a subject about which the 
seller has a right to assume that the buyer will 
make up his mind for himself, the means of 
information being equally open to both. 
Mrs. Bowman was a woman ol' kern acumen. She sought 
the consultation r William Bowman and Donald Bow-
man. All persons examined the property. There is no 
evidence to show any reliance on the part of any repre-
sentation of John Dussault nor is there any evidence of 
such a representation. Consequently, fraud is not pres-
en t Restatement <</ i out inch § 470. Where parties are 
dealing at arms length ;<nd i--eh has reasonable access 
to the same knowledge and neither has a peculiar knowl-
edge, fraud cannot be made out from non-disclosure. 
Swenson v. Strout Realty, Inc., 452 l \2d 1)72 (Nev. 
!;«*;»;, Phillips v. Homestake (\ Plasser Mines i *>.. 
273 Pac, r,V7 •, li)2*h. In similar con!', '••is. the evidence 
\v\s been deemed insufficient to establish fraud so as 
to provide a basis for recovery. Utley v. Airoso, 464 P.2d 
778 (Nev. 1970); Shira v. Cosgriff Neon Co., 320 Pac. 
426 (No*.. l'<.>8) : Clarh Sanitation, Inc. ? K Sun Valley 
Disposal ( ' . >:upra. 'The Tact that there was a family 
tie or asso"»aiion :*''hi!"»n^i>n re!ween the parnes add 
weigh* !')i ;.t sihMii.i'* ->n a * in sustain a ciiiiin of frami. 
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In Thatcher v. Peterson, 20 Utah 2d 290, 437 P.2d 213 
(1968) this court observed: 
On this appeal we are asked to determine 
whether membership in a religious fraternity 
in and of itself establishes such a confidential 
relationship that the law should protect one of 
the parties because he is presumed to have been 
influenced by the relationship. I t would 
appear that a fiduciary or confidential rela-
tionship woud not arise out of the membership 
in the fraternity above mentioned without 
evidence to show such a situation did in fact 
exist. The facts of record fail to show anything 
other than an arm's length dealing among the 
parties. 
Consequently, fraud has not been made out. 
D. Statute of Limitations 
The trial court found that respondents' action 
arising out of the Nevada property transactions was 
not precluded by the statute of limitations. As noted 
before, the transfer of the property to John Dussault 
occurred in June, 1961. The trial court found that Es-
tella Bowman was fully competent up until November, 
1967 (K, 565). The court further found that the statute 
of limitations had not run because there was no showing 
that Estella Bowman ever became aware of the true 
situation prior to her becoming incompetent in 1967 
(R. 197). Apparently, the trial court was applying 
the statute of limitations applicable to fraud actions. 
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;. * ^-I>-2(>(;i) Utah Cwiir Annotated, itKVi. However, 
as noted before, fraud wns noi |)le;ul. a requirement 
under the luv< of the Slate of Tt^h as we!! .is the State 
! N< )n;i. si;), was there evideiiee presented to support 
any claim of fraud. Further , the respondents were not 
ihe injured party. Therefore, if the judgment is to be 
sustained against the appellants and in favor of the 
respondents, it must rest on some oilier theory of relief 
in which event the provision- of * 7?> !2-i i ,n2h I ' lah 
Code Annotated, 11K>;J, v,«uild govern. Sinee the trans-
fer occurred in \\H\\ an I no ."eiion \va:, brought within 
four years thereafter, ilie provisions -f \hr reeited sec-
tion would bar the notion. 
For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court's award of judgment against the 
appellants arising out of the Reno Ranch transaction 
simply cannot stand. Such a determination of liability 
is conceptually unsound. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
I t is respectfully submitted that this court should 
reverse directions to enter judgment in favor of the 
appellants, The trust instrument establishing the trust 
which is the subject of the instant litigation obviously 
demonstrated an intent to avoid holding trustees liable 
:,
„ The statute of limitations applicable in the instant case would 
be that of the State of Utah since the statute is procedural 
and not substantive and the law of Nevada applies the same 
standard. Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws, Section 37 (1959); 
Wurfel, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws, 52 
No. Car. I Rev, 489, 492 (1947), 
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except in the rarest cases. The trial court at the time it 
rendered its decision did not have the advantage of this 
court's opinion in Dipo v. Dipo, supra. In light of that 
decision and the trust instrument in this case, appellants 
cannot be held liable. The evidence does not support 
liability and further the trial judge apparently inter-
jected himself into the critical area of testifying. The 
total evaluation of the administration of the trust shows 
that the actions of appellants were at best those of mis-
judgment. Therefore, no liability should be imposed. In 
the alternative, this court should reverse and grant a 
new trial requiring respondents to produce evidence in 
lieu of that which the court produced through judicial 
knowledge rather than judicial notice and requiring 
the court to apply a proper measure of damages. Finally, 
it is submitted that under no reasonable consideration of 
the facts and the law, can appellants be held liable for 
any actions associated with the Nevada property trans-
fers. This court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R I C H A R D R I C H A R D S 
670 28th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
R O N A L D N. BOYCE 
2504 Simpson Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorneys for Appellants 
John and Dorothy Dussault 
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